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8 June 1960

USSR

- I. ^{visible} Little/change since last week in situation in Moscow.
- A. Main event was Khrushchev press conference on disarmament. Language insulting to President and harsh on Germany, but he made no change in previous Soviet positions. (Text of K's press conference was broadcast in its entirety to foreign and home audiences. Soviet press continues personal attacks on President.)
- II. While we ^{believe} have no reason to think that K is ~~not~~ still giving the orders, we see continuing signs that he is engaged in some sort of political maneuver.
- A. His bitterness at US, and his attempts to show that he was not "taken in by the capitalists," seem to us indications that abrupt abandonment of "spirit of Camp David" to which he was deeply committed, has embarrassed him.
- B. The variations in tone and emphasis of his various statements since Paris suggest the tactics of a man under conflicting pressures. On a German peace treaty, for instance:
1. Paris press conference 18 May. K made implied threat that he might sign separate peace treaty in Berlin.
 2. Berlin speech 20 May. K virtually insulted East German leaders by making seemingly unnecessary commitment not to sign peace treaty for 6-8 months.
 3. Moscow speech, 28 May. K dismissed German problem in one sentence statement that "we will strive for settlement" of such problems as German peace treaty and Berlin.

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4. Moscow press conference, 3 June. In reply to question, K, without changing 6-8 months commitment, made one of strongest and most explicit statements yet on consequences for West of separate peace treaty.

C. Mikoyan's status still in doubt. Soviet efforts to assure world that he is merely on vacation--and indeed that all is well in Moscow--seem a little overdone.

1. We remember K's assurance to Hearst on the eve of Malenkov's downfall in 1955: "Georgi Maximilianovich is one of my best friends."

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E. Notable that Eastern Europeans unusually noncommittal on controversial issues. They have for instance not republished harsh 22 May Soviet article on Yugoslavs, which attacked imperialism in language reminiscent of Chinese.

1. Only exceptions are Albanians, who have special reasons for hating Tito.

III. We have report, dated late May, that conference of bloc leaders to be held in Moscow 16-20 June, with Mao possibly to attend. However, in light of more recent events, we doubt that meeting will come off.

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A. When this information received, Chinese probably still hoped that Khrushchev's performance at Paris would make possible patching-up of Sino-Soviet differences on policy toward West.

11B. Since Paris Khrushchev has carefully restated ideological positions distasteful to Chinese (war is not inevitable, US people want peace, negotiations are desirable.)

A. Chinese have responded by renewing their attack on Khrushchev. People's Daily in 7 June editorial nominally devoted to support for Soviet disarmament proposals, actually makes one of most open statements yet of opposition to Khrushchev's line.

D. Thus Soviets probably would now wish to avoid the kind of open argument with Chinese which took place at last meeting in February. However, Warsaw Pact meeting--with low-level Chinese observer--possible after Soviet policy stabilized. In meantime K may well revert to bilateral negotiations with bloc members as he did following Hungarian crisis.

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IV. [REDACTED] sums up his evaluation of the situation by saying that--while K still well in control--he reduces his estimate of K's tenure in office from 4-5 years to 1-2.

A. We are inclined to believe that issue is rather more immediate, i.e. if Khrushchev remains in control during next few months he will *(remain in control)* come out of summit business as strong as ever. (Note, next scheduled central committee meeting 13 July on mechanization in industry, but we would not be surprised if one occurred earlier). *(and discussed other topics)*

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1. His enemies will probably never get a better opportunity than they have now.
- B. However, we are still unable to identify any significant opposition to Khrushchev in the Central Committee or the Presidium.
 1. Problem is complicated because not clear what effect high-level personnel changes made 4 May would have in any sudden test of Khrushchev's strength.
- C. But K's performance in past political show-downs has been extremely skillful. His political machine is strong and his popular prestige high. We still think he is likely to come out on top should he be challenged.)

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